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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is authorized by Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which confers jurisdiction on the Utah
Appellate Court to hear an appeal from a final judgment of a
Circuit Court of U.C.A. Section 78-2A-3 (1953), as amended.
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of
Salt Lake County, Murray Department, State of Utah*
A Memorandum Decision was prepared by the Judge on September
10, 1987 and a judgment was formally executed by the Judge on
September 21, 1987 and served by the Clerk by mail on September
23, 1987.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff and Defendant had dated for some time and had
lived together.

They agreed to be married in February, 1986. On

May 30, 1986, the parties purchased a dinner ring for $1,599.00.
The receipts that were presented at trial are attached hereto as
Exhibit "A", and clearly indicate that the ring was purchased by
the Defendant.

The ring was appraised at $2,950.00 on or about

the 1st day of April, the parties separated and the Plaintiff
left the Defendant's residence.
On April 4, 1987, the Plaintiff returned to Defendant's
house and forcefully removed the dinner ring from Defendant's
finger and refused to return it.
the ring.

The Plaintiff allegedly sold

A Bill of Sale, appraisal and bond for this ring is

issued by Fred Meyers in the name of Rosalie Harris.

However, at

the trial, the Plaintiff claimed that the dinner ring was an
engagement ring.

The Defendant argues it was a dinner ring that
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belonged to Plaintiff.

The rings were not matched, could not be

worn together and the dinner ring was not an engagement ring.
Further, if was not a gift given in contemplation of marriage and
no facts were introduced at trial to even indicate who paid for
the ring.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPEAL
1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit the
Defendant to present the affirmative defense that the Defendant
was entitled to an offset due to the stolen dinner ring.
2. Whether the trial court erred by finding that it did not
matter which party broke the engagement, but that the law should
encourage rather than discourage breaking of engagements, and
thereby awarded the wedding rings to the Plaintiff.
3. Whether the trial court erred by awarding the wedding
rings to Plaintiff in that no consideration was required for a
promise to marry and no consideration was require by the giving
of the ring and accordingly no expectation that the donor may
recover the gift if the engagement was terminated.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties to this action had an on-again off-again "lovehate11 relationship for about two years.

In February of 1986,

while the parties were living together at the Defendant's
residence, they informally agreed for the first time to marry.
In May of 1986, the parties purchased a dinner ring for
$1,599.00.

The ring was not an engagement ring and was purchased

for the Defendant as all receipts (which were presented at trial)
which are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" clearly indicated that
the purchaser/owner was the Defendant.

At the time of purchase,

the dinner ring was appraised at $2,950.00.

2

The parties continued to have problems and in November of
1986 the Plaintiff terminated the relationship and moved from the
Defendants residence.

There was no attempt by the Plaintiff to

recover the dinner ring.
In January of 1987, the parties reconciled and at that time
they purchased a marriage ring set for $552.00. The marriage
ring set did not match the dinner ring and could not be worn
together.
In April, 1987, serious compatibility problems arose and the
Plaintiff again left the Defendant's residence and stated he
would not marry the Defendant.

Thereafter, on or about April 4,

1987 (after Plaintiff had vacated the premises), he returned, to
talk.

Following a fight, the Plaintiff forcefully removed the

dinner ring from the Defendant's hand and refused to return it.
The Plaintiff allegedly later sold the dinner ring.
The Defendant later sold the marriage rings to ZCMI for a
$552.00 credit.
The Plaintiff brought an action in small claims court to
recover the wedding rings.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
AT TRIAL
As to the marriage rings, the Plaintiff argued that the
wedding ring was given to the Defendant in contemplation of
marriage and since there was no marriage, he should be entitled
to recover the marriage rings.
The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff should not be
entitled to the marriage rings because the Plaintiff terminated
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the engagement and left the Defendant,
AS TO THE DINNER RING;
The Plaintiff argued that the dinner ring was owned by the
Defendant that it was not given in contemplation of marriage and
that the Bill of Sale, Receipt and Appraisal indicate it belonged
to the Defendant.

The Defendant testified that the Plaintiff

forcefully removed the ring after terminating the relationship.
The Defendant further argued that even if the Plaintiff were
entitled to recover the marriage rings, that she would be
entitled to offset any such amounts by the value of the dinner
ring.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DONOR WHO BREAKS ENGAGEMENT
MAY NOT RECOVER ENGAGEMENT RING
The law as it relates to gifts made in contemplation of
marriage is set forth generally in Am. Jr. 2d GIFTS Section 83,
and 46 ALR 3d 58.

In summary, these articles state that

generally the law of gifts as it applies in the case of
engagement rings is:
(1)

If the engagement is broken by the donee, the donor may

recover the ring.
(2)

If the engagement is broken, unjustifiedly, by the

donor, the donor may not recover the ring.
(3)

In some jurisdictions, if the engagement is terminated

by mutual agreement, the donor is entitled to recover the ring.
Generally, where this is the situation, there is a statutory
provision to that effect. (E.g., California Civil Code 1590).
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The states which embrace the above rules do so on either of
two bases.

(1) The ring given in contemplation of marriage is

an inducement to marry.

(2) The ring is symbolic of the future

marriage and the agreement to marry and amounts to a special
variety of gift, raising it above the normal laws of gifts.
There are no Utah cases dealing with the subject.

The only

statutory provision that may apply to this action is U.C.A. (255-4(3), which provides that "Every agreement, promise or
undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual
promises to marry must be in writing or it is void."

It is

logical to surmise that no consideration is required for the
mutual promise to marry except those mutual promises. Therefore,
any gift given in contemplation of marriage is merely a gift and
the only way a donor could reserve a right to recover the gift
(i.e. ring), would be to make such a reservation in writing.
Even the California Statutes, CC1590 clearly provides that a
gift made in contemplation of marriage is recoverable only if the
donee refused to marry.

If the donor refuses to marry the gift

is not recoverable, Simonian vs. Donoian (1950) 96 CA2d 259, 215
P2d 119.

The authority for this proposition is simply

overwhelming:

See also 38 Cal LRev 532; Rest. Restitution

Section 58 Comment (c) and 2 ALR 2d 579.
The Court in the instant action held contrary and stated
that the "policy of the law in Utah" does not relate to who broke
off the engagement but is to roster breaking off of engagements
that were unwisely entered into.

There is simply no authority in

Utah that would support such a statement of the policy of Utah.
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In fact D.C.A. {25-5-4(3) requires all promises except promises
to marry to be in writing.
The Court further ruled that neither party presented
sufficient evidence as to which party was at fault and broke off
the engagement.

Since the Plaintiff had the burden of proof in

proving he did not break the engagement, the Court was obligated
to find that claims were established on that point and
accordingly must rule that the Defendant broke off the
engagement.

The law then clearly prevents the Plaintiff rom

recovering the engagement ring.
This Court should so rule but as a minimum should remand
with instructions to determine who broke off the engagement.
Lastly, the Utah Courts have not accepted the symbolic or
inducement approaches to the giving of an engagement ring.
Therefore, since no consideration is required for mutual marriage
promises and no consideration is required for a gift absolute,
there is no rational expectation that the donor may recover the
engagement ring if the engagement is terminated.
POINT II
OWNERSHIP OF THE DINNER RING
IS AN ISSUE IN THIS ACTION
The Court flat out ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to
possession of the dinner ring and that his ownership was not in
issue in this action, because the Plaintiff has already taken
possession of the dinner ring.

Such is an improper ruling.

Although the "symbolic meaning" of an engagement ring may
exist, that same meaning does not exist for other gifts.
Interestingly, the case of Albanese vs. Indelicato cited by the
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Small Claims Judge may hold against his own opinion and ruling
thereon.

In that case, the court awarded the engagement ring

back to the donor, but held that a dinner ring and money given to
the donee were not recoverable.

The court stated:

The giving of the dinner ring is an
entirely different proposition. True,
it was given after the parties became
engaged. No doubt plaintiff would not
have given the ring to defendant if
they had not been engaged. The dinner
ring though has no symbolic meaning
and is only a token of the love and
affection which plaintiff bore for the
defendant. Many gifts are made for
reasons that sour with the passage of
time. Under the law though, there is no
consideration required for a gift and it
is absolute once made unless a condition
imposed.
Conversely, if a condition were imposed, it would appear that the
statute of frauds would apply.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE
AWARDED AN OFFSET
In the instant action, the Defendant has characterized the
first ring given her as a dinner ring while the Plaintiff states
it was an engagement ring.
not be worn together.

The rings were not matched, and could

Further, if was never meant to be an

engagement ring, it was a dinner ring.

(The Court, however, made

no ruling on this fact).
The Defendant offered to prove an affirmative defense at the
time of trial, namely that if the Plaintiff prevailed as to the
wedding rings, that the Defendant should at least be entitled to
an offset in an amount equal to the dinner ring.
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The testimony

at trial indicates that the dinner ring was purchased in May of
1986.

The parties, however, had agreed in February of 1986 to

marry but no wedding rings (engagement) were purchased until
January of 1987, when the engagement was formalized.
The Court found the Plaintiff had possession of the dinner
ring and that ring was not relevant to this action.
improper, for reasons previously stated.

Such is

The Court refused to

permit the Defendant to defend on the grounds of offset. Such
was improper.
The Defendant could clearly have field a Counterclaim to
offset the Plaintiff's claim, but chose to defend affirmatively.
The Defendant draws the Court's attention to Rogue River vs. Shaw
(1966) 411 P2d 440 243 Or. 54, where the Court stated"
". . . a set-off is a money demand
by Defendant against Plaintiff,
arising upon contract and constituting
a debt independent of and unconnected
with the Cause of Action set forth in
the Complaint, and may be used to offset Plaintiff's claim but not to recover affirmatively."
See also Black Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, pg. 1538 Set-Off.
The Court improperly refused to permit the Defendant from
proving a set-off as to the dinner ring.

This action should be

at least remanded with instructions.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it is clear that the trial court committed
several errors, namely it failed to:

consider any evidence

submitted by the defendant regarding the affirmative defense and
offset relating to ownership of the dinner ring; properly
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consider and apply the laws of the State of Utah in that it
applied a public policy to encourage the breaking of engagements
without the prospect of recovering the engagement ring regardless
of fault; and, failed to find that either the Plaintiff(donor) or
the Defendant(donee) was the party who refused to complete the
marriage.

This court should reverse the lower courts ruling or

remand it back to the trial court with appropiate instructions.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

fj*l
DENNIS L. MANGRUM
Attorney for Defendant
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To Whom It May Concern:
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has this day purchased the jewelry described above. We certify that the precious metals
used in this jewelry meet the standards established by the United States Government
Stamping Act for Karat Gold or Platinum. Fred Meyer will allow theJul! purchase
price stated above (which is exclusive of taxes) in trade, on the purchase of any
diamond jewelry two hundred dollars or more of greater value. In addition^
Fred Meyer Jewelers will inspect and clean the diamond mounting whenever
requested by the original purchaser or recipient, free of charge.
Caution. Although diamond is the hardest natural substance, it is not unbreakable.
Protect your diamond and your investment by shielding it against
concussions which may cause chipping or breaking.
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